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Abstract 
The present study aimed to explore if the size of company an individual works for, age or attitudes 
towards cyber security affected frequency to engage in risky online behaviours. A total of 515 
participants aged between 18-84 in full or part-time employment were asked to complete a 
questionnaire that consisted of two scales. One measured their attitude towards cyber security and 
general awareness of cyber crime, the other examined the types of ‘risky’ cyber security behaviours 
they were engaged in. The results demonstrated a significant negative correlation between attitudes 
towards cyber security and risky cyber security behaviours, with more negative attitudes being linked to 
higher levels of risky behaviours. There were also significant differences according to company size and 
age group according to frequency of engaging in risky cyber security behaviour and attitudes towards 
cyber security. The findings are presented as furthering our understanding of how employee attitudes 
contribute to company cyber security, as well as highlighting how the size of an organisation could be 
linked to difference in knowledge and adherence to ISA protocols. 
________________________________________________________________________   
Keywords: Accidental insider, risky cyber security behaviours, cyber security, Information 
security. 
 
Introduction  
In the fight to protect organisations from information theft and cyber crime, a great 
deal of attention has been devoted to improving existing information security 
infrastructure (Herath & Rao, 2009a, b). The focus on technical solutions to cyber 
security often fails to acknowledge that for such systems to be effective, employee 
engagement and understanding of their utility is required (Sasse & Flechais, 2005). A 
number of researchers have commented on the realisation that, for the most part, the 
weakest element in the cyber security chain is that of the human (Anwar et al., 2016; 
Herath & Rao, 2009b). Aspects of passive engagement, lack of knowledge, misdirected 
attention and engaging in risky cyber security behaviours all have the potential to increase 
organisational susceptibility to security flaws (Sasse & Flechais, 2005). Having a deeper 
understanding of how individual differences related to employee adherence to IT security 
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protocols could hold the key to managing an effective cyber security posture within an 
organisation. In a similar context, exploring how organisational factors such as the size of 
the company for which the individual works could also provide another metric for 
isolating those companies that might have a higher risk of being victimized due to a 
breach in cyber security. The present study aims to explore if there are significant 
differences in employees engaging in risky cyber security behaviours based on their age, 
the size of the company, or the employee’s attitudes towards cyber security and cyber 
crime.  
 
Exploring the threat from within the Organisation 
Over the past decade there has been an increasing amount of attention directed towards 
exploring aspects of insider threat.  The insider threat is typically defined as a current or 
former employee who has (or had) access to internal systems, and through this access they 
are able to conduct a variety of malicious activities (Claycomb, Huth, & Flynn, 2012). 
The threat from insider has been presented as a growing concern for the internal security 
of an organisation(Claycomb et al., 2012; Greitzer, Kangas, Noonan, & Dalton, 2010; 
Keeney, 2005; Probst, Hunker, Gollmann, & Bishop, 2010). The threat from the insider is 
multifaceted and relates in part to breaches in security, impact on the prestige of the 
company, and related financial loss (CPNI, 2013). 
The focus for insider threat is often on incidents where aspects of intentionality or 
motive are central; therefore threats from unintentional actions are often overlooked. 
However other researchers have argued against the label of insider threat and adopted the 
more flexible term of insiderness (Bishop, Gollmann, Hunker, & Probst, 2008; Hunker & 
Probst, 2011). For example, Hunker and Probst (2011) presented a comparison of the 
actions for accidental insiders to those of a real insider, the latter being a category where 
individuals exhibit malicious intent in their exploits and advanced skills or expertise, 
including knowledge related to programming, IT infrastructure and company systems. At 
the opposite end of the continuum are the accidental or unintentional insiders. These are 
individuals who have limited knowledge of accepted security protocols, their actions are 
obvious, and they make no direct attempt to cover up their mistakes. It is the accidental 
insiders who present the focus for this current work, alongside an examination of how 
individual differences could make certain people more prone to lapses in cyber security. 
The CERT (2013) report presented a very detail definition of the unintentional insider 
threat (UIT), which is: 
 
… a current or former employee, contractor, or business partner who has or had 
authorized access to an organization’s network, system, or data and who, through 
action or inaction without malicious intent, causes harm or substantially increases 
the probability of future serious harm to the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of the organization’s information or information systems. (CERT, 
2013, p. ix) 
 
This definition focuses directly on threat as a result of inaction or specific lack of 
knowledge and also highlights the lack intent to cause harm. The key components for the 
conceptualization of UIT are directly linked to human failure and limitations in human 
performance (CERT, 2013). These mistakes include those made though job-related time 
pressures, task difficulty, a lack of knowledge, and cognitive factors such as inattention 
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(CERT, 2013). Examples of UIT presented by CERT (2013) included accidental 
disclosure of sensitive information (either via website, email or fax); devolving of log-in 
details (password and username) either as a result social engineering or via 
malware/spyware; the improper disposal of physical records; the loss of information 
through the misplacement of smart-phones, USB drives, DVDs, CDs and hard drives. 
These random acts present a greater concern for organisations as they have no motive, no 
intent and no prior indicators upon which to act. Unfortunately, the end result is still the 
same, and the actions of the UIT can be as damaging as those perpetrated by the malicious 
attacker. 
 
Examining Individual Differences in Cyber Security  
In the context of UIT, some researchers have explored information security behaviours 
alongside an examination of psychological constructs such as personality traits. Egelman 
and Peer (2015a; 2015b) presented the development of the Security Behaviours Intentions 
Scale (SeBIS), designed to explore an individual’s adherence to computer security advice. 
Egelman and Peer (2015b) noted individuals scoring higher on measures of inquisitiveness 
were more likely to engage in better security practices. Good security practices were also 
linked to an assessment of the long-term impact for the individuals’ current actions. 
Personality constructs such as impulsivity were negatively associated with adherent cyber 
security behaviours. Research from Egelman and Peer (2016b) suggested that those 
individuals who are quick to react or fail to think carefully about their decisions (such as 
responding quickly to a phishing email) are less engaged in good cyber security 
behaviours. Those individuals who demonstrated a capacity to engage proactively in 
decision-making also scored higher on the SeBIS showing that active cyber security is not 
associated with a reliance on others (Egelman and Peer, 2015b).  
Previous work has also examined the link between age of individuals and their 
adherence to information security protocols. For example (McCormac et al., 2017) found 
that older adults (30-65+ years) had higher scores on a measure of information security 
awareness compared to younger adults (18-29 years). They also noted that such a 
relationship was linear in nature, with information security scores increasing with the age 
of the participant. Previous research by Sheng et al. (2010)had also noted that those 
individuals aged between 18-25 were more likely to fall for phishing attacks versus any 
other age group. According to these researchers this group tends to be more susceptible to 
phishing attacks as they have a lower level of education, have spent fewer years on the 
Internet and also have had less exposure to relevant training materials(Sheng et al., 2010). 
They also noted that this age group were less risk averse compared to the older 
participants in their study, a finding which also fits into previous research linking age to 
risky behaviours (Reyna & Farley, 2006).  
However, the link between age and risky cyber security behaviours is still limited to 
just a handful of studies. In the context of the present study the concept of risky cyber 
security behaviours is viewed as any activity that places the individual and organisation at 
increased threat from malicious attacks (Hadlington, 2017; Hadlington & Parsons, 2017). 
Such activities can include sharing personal passwords, downloading copyrighted material 
from illegal websites and ignoring warnings to update apps and computer software. A 
further exploration of the way in which age impacts on both attitudes towards cyber 
security and engagement in risky behaviours could have clear practical uses, particularly 
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when it comes to designing effective communication packages for cyber security 
awareness. 
 
Aims and Objectives of the Present Study 
The notion of UIT presents a potential starting point from which researchers, the 
police and security professionals can explore non-malicious threats within an organisation. 
There is still a limited amount of empirical research that directly examines how individual 
differences could serve to influence the potential for UIT, perhaps due to the belief that 
technical solutions can provide mitigation for such. The aim of the present study is to 
explore if the frequency of engaging in risky cyber security behaviours can be linked to 
organisational factors (size of organisation for which the individual works for), their age, 
and their attitudes towards cyber security. Previous work has noted that the size of an 
organisation can influence key aspects of cyber security, including aspects related to 
training and budgetary commitments (Briney & Prince, 2002; Osborn, 2015). Exploring 
the role company size has upon engagement in risky cyber security behaviours and 
employee attitudes towards cyber security could provide another important metric to help 
target awareness in a more proactive way. Therefore the aims of the present study are 
captured in the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: There will be a significant difference between age groups and company size 
based on respondent’s attitudes towards cyber security. 
 
H2: There will be a significant difference between age groups and company size 
based on respondent’s engagement in risky cyber security behaviours.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited via an online questionnaire through Qualtrics Online 
Sampling between 15
th
-20
th
 October 2016, and were paid a small honorarium of £3 for 
their participation. In total 538 participants completed the survey, all of which were based 
in the U.K. Data from 23 respondents were deleted and excluded from further analyses 
due to incomplete or missing data.  
The final dataset included 515 participants, comprising of 218 Males and 297 Females. 
For the sample of 515 participants, the participants had an age range of 18 – 84, (18-24 = 
17%, 25-34 = 30%, 35-44 = 3%, 45-54 = 24%, 55-64 = 24%, 65+ = 3%). For the 
purposes of the ANOVA analysis, two age groups with roughly equal numbers in each 
were created (18-34 and 35-64+) based on the findings from McCormac et al. (2017). All 
participants were in employed, with the majority of respondents (70%) being full-time, 
and the remainder (30%) being part-time. In terms of company size, 12% of respondents 
worked for organizations with less than 10 employees, 21% with 11-50 employees, 22% 
with 51-250 employees and 44% worked for companies with more than 250 employees.  
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Measures 
a. Risky cyber security behaviours scale (RScB) 
Hadlington (2017) presented the development of a scale designed to explore key 
activities that could potentially lead to individuals being compromised as a consequence of 
poor cyber security practices. Participants are asked to rate on a 5-point Likert scale 
(0=Never - 5 = Daily) how often they engaged in the specific behaviour during a one-
month period. Items included ‘sharing passwords with friends and colleagues’ and ‘Using the 
same password for multiple websites’. A Cronbach’s alpha of .823 was obtained for the full 20-
item scale, indicating good internal reliability. Possible scores on the RScB can range from 
0-100. Higher scores on the RScB were indicative of the individual engaging in more 
risky online behaviours. 
 
b. Attitudes towards cyber security in business (ATC-IB) 
This scale examines attitudes related cyber security as well as examining how individual 
employees perceived the threats from cyber crime (Hadlington, 2017). Aspects included 
responsibility for cyber security in the organization, perceived effectiveness of the Police 
in dealing with cyber crime, signposting of relevant information, and engagement with 
cyber security awareness.  
The scale consists of 25 items and includes questions such as I don’t have the right skills to 
be able to protect the organization from cyber crime and I do not feel that IT security is a priority 
within my organization. The scale is scored using a 4-point Likert scale (1=Strongly Agree – 
4 = Strongly Disagree). A high score on the ATC-IB scale indicates positive engagement 
and awareness in cyber security; where as a lower score indicates poorer engagement and 
limited awareness. Scores on the ATC-IB can range from 25 – 100. A Cronbach’s Alpha 
of .764 was achieved in the current study indicating good internal reliability. 
 
Results 
Means and standard deviations for the RScB and ATC-IB as a function of age and 
company size are presented in Tables 1 and 2. The responses to the items from the ATC-
IB are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations for total scores on the Risky Cyber 
security Behaviours Scale (RScB) according to age and company size 
 
Variable  M SD n 
Age Group    
18-34 28.55 15.99 242 
35-64 19.44 12.23 273 
Total 23.72 14.81 515 
Company Size    
10 or less 23.17 16.38 63 
11-50 25.61 14.96 110 
51-250 27.07 17.97 115 
250 + 21.25 11.85 227 
Total 23.72 14.81 515 
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations for total scores in the Attitudes 
towards Cyber security in Business (ATC-IB) according to age and company 
size 
Variable M SD N 
Age Group    
18-34 58.55 7.30 242 
35-64+ 61.65 7.02 273 
Total 60.19 7.312 515 
Company Size    
10 or less 59.77 8.37 63 
11-50 59.04 6.20 110 
51-250 59.18 7.31 115 
250 + 61.38 7.37 227 
Total 60.19 7.31 515 
 
Table 3. Scale items from the ATC-IB
2
 & responses (%) 
 
 Item Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
1 I think that management have the 
responsibility to ensure a company is 
protected from cyber crime 
53 44.5 1.7 0.8 
2* I am aware of my role in keeping the 
company protected from potential cyber 
criminals. 
2.5 10.7 54.0 32.8 
3 I believe everyone in the company has a 
role to play in protecting against threats 
from cyber criminals. 
42.9 50.5 5.2 1.4 
4 It is hard to know how I can help 
protect the organisation from cyber 
crime. 
8.5 50.1 35.9 5.4 
5 I don't have the right skills to be able to 
protect the organisation from cyber 
crime. 
9.7 46.2 38.6 5.4 
6 I do not feel that IT security is a priority 
within my organisation. 
5.4 28.9 43.5 22.1 
7 Computer systems provide all the 
protection a company needs. 
7.0 29.0 52.0 12.0 
8 I think that reporting cyber crime is a 
waste of time. 
2.1 15.3 51.1 31.5 
9 The Police lack the capacity to deal with 
cyber crime effectively. 
10.1 53.6 32.4 3.9 
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10 I believe that cyber criminals are more 
advanced than the people who are 
supposed to be protecting us. 
18.6 60.2 19.8 1.4 
11 I think that information provided by the 
Government and Police on cyber crime 
is not relevant to businesses. 
4.9 31.1 56.9 7.2 
12 I feel that the Police are far too busy to 
deal with cyber crime. 
13.0 53.0 30.7 3.3 
13 I worry that if I report a cyber attack to 
the Police it might damage the 
reputation of the company 
5.0 29.7 54.2 11.1 
14
* 
I think more could be done to 
communicate the risks from cyber crime 
to individuals in the organisation. 
1.6 12.8 70.1 15.5 
15
* 
I am aware of the company's IT use 
policy and attempt to follow it. 
2.7 15.5 55.7 26.0 
16 I would not know how to report a cyber 
attack if one happened. 
8.3 35.5 44.3 11.8 
17 I don't think that reporting a cyber 
attack on the company is my 
responsibility. 
5.6 44.3 41.9 5.8 
18 I don’t pay attention to company 
material about the threats from cyber 
crime. 
2.9 21.9 56.1 19.0 
19
* 
I am confident that I would be able to 
spot the signs of a cyber attack. 
6.4 43.5 44.3 5.8 
20
* 
I think the biggest threat for IT systems 
comes from people within the company. 
5.6 44.3 41.9 8.2 
21
* 
I feel that any individual within the 
company are at risk of manipulation 
from confidence tricksters. 
1.4 16.5 65.2 16.9 
22 I think that cyber criminals only target a 
company when there is a substantial 
financial gain. 
9.5 39.4 43.9 7.2 
23 I believe that only large companies are 
targeted by hackers and cyber criminals. 
4.3 19.8 60.6 15.3 
24 I feel that only companies that take 
payments using online systems are at risk 
of being victims of cyber crime. 
7.4 25.3 52.4 14.8 
25 I don't think I know who is responsible 
for protecting the company from cyber 
crime. 
6.6 42.3 40.2 10.9 
* = indicates a reversed score item 
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A correlation revealed a significant negative correlation for total scores on the RCsB 
questionnaire and total scores on the ATC-IB (r = -.302 (515), p = .000), suggesting that 
a more positive attitude towards cyber security is linked to a decrease in the frequency 
with which they engage in risky cyber security behaviours. In the following section the 
scores for both the RScB and ATC-IB are reported in terms of age group differences and 
company size for which the individual is working.  
 
i. Age, Company size and Risky Cyber security Behaviours 
A one-way between subjects ANOVA revealed a significant difference between age 
groups and scores on the RScB F (1, 513) = 53.392, p = 000, η
p
2
 .094, indicating a 
medium effect size. A further between subjects ANOVA revealed a significant main effect 
for company size and scores on the RScB, F (3, 511) = 4.790, p> .005, η
p
2
 .027 indicating 
a small effect size. Further post hoc comparisons revealed significant differences between 
those employed by companies over 250 employees and those with between 51-250 
employees (p> .005).  
 
ii. Age, Company Size and Attitude towards Cyber security 
A between subjects ANOVA revealed a significant difference between age groups and 
scores on the attitudes towards cyber security in business scale F (1, 513) = 24.134, p = 
000, η
p
2 
= 0.045, indicating a medium effect size. 
A further between-subjects ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for company size 
on attitudes towards cyber security, F(3, 511) = 3.783, p= 0.11, η
p
2 
= 0.022, indicative of 
a medium effect size. A post hoc comparison showed a significant difference between 
overall scores on the attitude scale for employees in companies over 250 + and 51-250 
(p= 0.50) and for 250+ and 11-50 employees (p = .033). 
 
Discussion 
The present study aimed to provide empirical evidence examining how aspects of age, 
individual differences in attitudes towards cyber security, and company size impact on the 
cyber security posture of an organisation. The results supported the hypotheses for the 
study, as there were significant differences according to both age and company size in 
relation to the frequency with which individuals engaged in risky cyber security 
behaviours. 
  
1. Attitudes towards Cyber security  
One of the fundamental findings from exploring the attitudes of employees is the 
apparent sense of devolved responsibility they have in terms of their cyber security 
responsibilities within an organisation. This would potentially align with suggestions from 
Tischer et al. (2016) that individuals are devolving a responsibility for their cyber security 
to technical interventions and senior management. The attitude appears to be that once 
they are in their place of employment they no longer see cyber security as their primary 
concern. This would also fit into a risk compensation framework, where an individual 
who believes they are protected by technical interventions provided by their host 
organisation may in turn engage in more risky cyber security behaviours (Hadlington & 
Parsons, 2017). 
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Many participants expressed a lack of knowledge or skill related to being able to deal 
with cyber security incidents. Fifty-eight per cent of those questioned claimed that they 
did not to know how to protect the company from cyber crime. An additional 55% 
reported that they thought they did not have the skills necessary to fulfil this responsibility 
(see Table 3). This may reflect a belief that specialist knowledge or skills such as 
programming proficiency or digital forensics are needed to be able to actively engage in 
cyber security. As a future piece of research, it would be useful to examine this aspect 
further and identify what specific skills employees believe they need in order to be 
engaged in this role.  
Issues related to a lack of attention to information and awareness related to key risks is 
also highlighted, where 84% of respondents appeared to feel that there is already enough 
information about communicating the key risks from cyber crime. It could be that 
individuals face an inordinate amount of material related to potential risks that could be 
leading to less attention being paid to them. This is in part evidenced by an additional 25% 
of respondents who admitted to regularly ignoring information from employers 
communicating current threats and how to prevent them. It would again be useful to 
explore the reasons why individuals choose to ignore such information in future research. 
As noted by Egelman and Peer (2015), end users are often presented with messages about 
cyber security that are both inconclusive and inconsistent, so ignoring these messages 
could be a more effective use of their time. Indeed, Egelman, Cranor, and Hong (2008) 
had shown that where less-frequent high-risk warnings appeared in a similar way to 
frequent low-risk security warning, this had the effect of leading end users to actively 
ignore both.  
A high percentage of those who responded viewed the police to be ineffectual when it 
comes to dealing with cyber crime. Overall, 80% of respondents believed that cyber 
criminals were more advanced than those who were preventing the attacks. When 
exploring their capacity to deal with cyber crime effectively, 66% viewed the police as 
having clear limitations. Contrary to this, only 17% of respondents saw reporting cyber 
crime as a waste of time; however, there is no additional data to explore if participants 
knew exactly where to report such events. These finding are problematic from a number 
of perspectives. If individuals believe that the police are ill equipped to deal with cyber 
crime, they may in turn believe reporting such incidents to be ineffectual and pointless. 
Further research should explore the potential reasons as to why individuals hold such 
attitudes, as such beliefs could have a clear impact on the potential for the under reporting 
of cyber crime.  
 
2. Age groups, Risky Cyber security Behaviours and Attitudes towards Cyber security 
The difference in attitudes towards cyber security according to age groups is an 
interesting result, with individuals in the higher age bracket demonstrating a more positive 
attitude towards cyber security. A potential reason for this could be linked to the 
personality trait of conscientiousness, associated with the propensity to follow rules and 
norms that are set by society (Jackson et al., 2009). The trait is also linked to planning, 
delay in gratification, and the ability to control impulses, and has been shown to increase 
with age (Jackson et al., 2009). It could be that those individuals in the higher age bracket 
are more conscientious and see engaging in good cyber security practices as being an 
essential part of their working life. Previous research exploring information security 
awareness has also noted that conscientiousness significantly explained variance in ISA 
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(McCormac et al., 2016). In the absence of the actual differences in conscientiousness 
according to age groups, this suggestion is presented as conjecture, but provides the basis 
for potential further research in this area. 
The frequency with which individuals engaged in risky cyber security behaviours also 
presented a similar age divide, with those in the younger age group engaging in more 
frequent risky activities. (McCormac et al., 2017) previously noted a linear relationship 
between age and information security awareness, with better awareness coming with older 
age. There are a variety of potential reasons for such a trend, a key one being related to 
aspects of risk aversion. Previous work has found that younger people are less risk adverse, 
making them prone to engage in more risk taking behaviours (Reyna & Farley, 2006). 
However, such a suggestion is problematic in light of the findings from McCormac et al. 
(2017) who found a significant relationship between age and information security 
awareness even when risk-taking propensity was controlled for. This suggests that another 
factor outside of age differences in risk taking influences engagement in information 
security awareness, potentially also linked to difference in personality traits such as 
conscientiousness.  
 
3. Company Size, Risky Cyber security Behaviours and Attitudes towards Cyber security 
Significant differences for risky cyber security behaviours and attitudes towards cyber 
security in relation to the size of the company for which the individual was working were 
also noted. It is interesting to note that those working with companies with 250 or more 
employees had the highest level of engagement in risky cyber security behaviours. Again, 
without engaging in further research the reasons for such a difference remain unclear. On 
the one hand it may be that larger organizations have better communication systems or 
effective cyber security measures due to larger budgets. Risky behaviours demonstrate a 
similar pattern, but in this instance there appears to be a level at which risky behaviour 
plateaus in the 51-250 sized company category, and then drops sharply in organizations 
over 250. Individuals employed by larger organizations may be made more aware of the 
risks of engaging in dubious cyber security practices, which again links to potential 
differences in budget and organizational polices. As this information was not collected in 
the context of the present study, it would be good to establish this link in further 
empirical work in this area.  
 
Conclusion 
The findings from the present study serve to highlight interplay between cyber 
security attitudes and behaviours of employees. In terms of risky cyber security behaviours, 
the majority of employees questioned still engaged in some form of activity that in turn 
increased the likelihood of a breach in cyber security. Behaviours such as the use of the 
same password for multiple websites, sharing passwords with colleagues, and clicking on 
links in emails are all active parts of most information security policies, but are still evident 
in this sample. Aspects such as lack of skills, knowledge and awareness were seen as the 
key barriers for individuals engaging in active cyber security, presenting a pathway for 
further research in this area.  
The research and the tools presented within this study are intended to be used further 
in a practical manner and should be viewed as being reactive, not only in terms of the 
development of new technologies but also additional policies in the context of cyber 
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security. The study found evidence that businesses and/or the public are unsure about 
how to report a cyber crime event, so an increase in education and awareness of the 
process would enhance the ease of reporting. Although Action Fraud and the National 
Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) were not mentioned specifically in the survey, the 
results highlighted an apparent lack of knowledge as to how the police take reports of 
cyber crime and how it is dealt with. There might be a case for ensuring that all customer-
facing officers and staff can recognize a case of cyber crime when it is reported to them, 
and that they too, can signpost the customer to the reporting facilities (e.g. Action Fraud) 
with ease. As 58% of those who completed the survey were unaware of prevention or 
protection measures against cyber crime, the Fraud Defence Test
3
  might prove a valuable 
place to start. 
 
Limitations to the present research 
The research presented here is not without its limitations. The scales presented rely 
heavily on self-reported data from participants about their activities over a period of one 
month. It may be that the individual is presenting an ideal representation of their cyber 
security behaviour rather than their actual behaviours, perhaps in part due to suspicion that 
their employers might use such information (Hadlington & Parsons, 2017).  
The two scales presented here also need further testing with a wider and more varied 
group of participants. Only through further use of the scales in wider and more varied 
populations, as well as continued assessment of their validity and reliability activities, can 
their usability in the context of practical research situations be established. The comparison 
of the risky cyber security behaviours questionnaire to existing scales such as the SeBIS 
and correlated personality factors would also be another step in the research process, as 
well as exploring other potential individual differences (e.g. altruism, work identity, work 
locus of control). 
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